Teresa Darwin Phillips was a practicing attorney in DeKalb County, Alabama. She handled matters across the state, serving as trusted counsel in real estate transactions and estate administration. Clients placed their trust in Phillips; but that trust was ultimately misplaced. In October 2019, the Alabama State Bar received a report of possible theft involving a real estate transaction. The Bar gathered additional reports and forwarded them to the DeKalb County District Attorney’s Office. Following the referral, the District Attorney’s Office launched an investigation into Phillips’ law practice. The investigation revealed that Phillips had defrauded multiple clients. As a result, she ultimately pleaded guilty to first-, second-, and third-degree theft of property; first- and third-degree theft by deception; and first-, second-, and third-degree financial exploitation of an elderly person. In exchange for her guilty plea, the State dismissed additional charges against Phillips.

The plea agreement was entered on November 7, 2022. As part of the agreement, “Phillips… agreed to pay restitution to her victims in the following manner: $10,000 to L. Ronald Pannell or Lance and Cynthia Kittle; $94,000 to Donna Schultz; $777 to Ron Gifford; $1,050 to Janice Woo; $68,000 to Terri Cornett or Carol Newsome, as personal representatives of the estate of Mary Helen Slaton; and $7,600 to Janice Woo, as personal representative of the estate of Anna Price.” Phillips v. State, No. CR-2024-0078, 2025 WL 939442, at *2 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2025).

The plea agreement also postponed “the sentencing hearing for a minimum of 60 days to allow Phillips time before the sentencing hearing to make payments toward restitution owed to the victims.” Id. However, the State and Phillips did not agree on the final terms of sentencing. Regarding sentencing, the written agreement stated that Phillips “understands that her payment of restitution pending sentencing shall be used as a determinative factor… related to sentencing.” Id.

At the time of the plea, the State had not provided notice of any aggravating factors. Aggravating factors are elements that allow a court to impose a sentence at the higher end of the statutory range for a given offense. Without aggravating factors, the presumptive sentence for Phillips was a “nonprison recommendation and a durational range of 24 to 46 months.” Id. However, with aggravating factors, she could face a sentencing range of “2 to 20 years’ imprisonment.” Id. Accordingly, when Phillips entered into the plea agreement—without any aggravating factors having been raised—she believed she would receive a nonprison sentence within the 24-to-46-month range. However, the day before the sentencing hearing, the State filed notice of its intent to present aggravating factors, to which Phillips objected.

The State argued that Phillips should have anticipated the possibility of aggravating factors based on the nature of the offenses she had pleaded guilty to, specifically, crimes involving elderly or vulnerable victims. Id. The State also pointed out that Phillips had failed to pay restitution, as required by the plea agreement.

In order for the State to present aggravating factors with late notice, the trial court was required to find “good cause,” which it did at its own discretion. In finding good cause, the court stated that “considering the extensive negotiations, the large amount of restitution at issue, and the nature of Phillips's relationship with her victims, it was reasonable to assume that aggravating factors would be considered at sentencing.” Id. As a result of the court’s consideration of those aggravating factors, Phillips was sentenced to “20 years’ imprisonment”, the maximum allowed under the law. Id.

In response to her sentencing, Phillips appealed, arguing that the issue on appeal was “whether good cause existed for the State's late notice of aggravating factors.” Id. On March 28, 2025, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that good cause did exist for the State’s late filing. Although the State was required to provide Phillips with “notice of aggravating factors no less than seven (7) days before trial,” Id. at 6, the court noted that late notice may be excused if good cause is shown, specifically, if it is “given at any time with the consent of the trial court, provided the defendant is given an opportunity to research and rebut the aggravating factor[s].” Id.

The court emphasized that “the State and Phillips's discussion of statutory ranges of punishment and the failure to agree to any specific sentencing terms all support the trial court's finding that aggravating factors were, at a minimum, discussed during settlement negotiation.” Id. This finding supported the conclusion that Phillips was on notice of the potential aggravating factors and had an opportunity to investigate and rebut them. Additionally, the plea agreement required Phillips to make payments toward restitution prior to sentencing for that factor to be considered in mitigation. However, she made no payments, arguably breaching a central term of the agreement. Id. The court also pointed out that “Phillips stated that she understood that her sentencing determination would be dependent upon her payment of restitution.” Id. This acknowledgment further demonstrated that Phillips was aware her failure to pay restitution could negatively affect her sentence. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “the trial court did not abuse its substantial discretion in determining that good cause existed for the State's late notice of aggravating factors.” Id.

In this case, the court reached the correct decision. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s exercise of substantial discretion. The trial court, having overseen the settlement negotiations and plea proceedings, was in the best position to determine whether the State had good cause to file its notice of aggravating factors late. On appellate review, it would be exceptionally difficult to second-guess such a determination, given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry. Here, the appellate court appropriately limited its review to clear legal error and deferred to the trial court’s judgment, recognizing that the trial court was more familiar with the timing, context, and circumstances surrounding the plea. The issue of good cause was inherently fact-driven, and the lower court was better suited to make that assessment

By upholding the trial court’s discretion, the Court of Criminal Appeals exercised its authority in a measured and appropriate manner. Its deference to the trial court’s findings was consistent with sound appellate practice and promotes stability in plea and sentencing procedures. The decision reflects judicial restraint and fidelity to the standard of review, and should be commended.

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